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Abstract. Power side-channel attacks, which can deduce secret data
via statistical analysis, have become a serious threat. Masking is an ef-
fective countermeasure for reducing the statistical dependence between
secret data and side-channel information. However, designing masking
algorithms is an error-prone process. In this paper, we propose a hybrid
approach combing type inference and model-counting to verify masked
arithmetic programs against side-channel attacks. The type inference
allows an efficient, lightweight procedure to determine most observable
variables whereas model-counting accounts for completeness. In case that
the program is not perfectly masked, we also provide a method to quan-
tify the security level of the program. We implement our methods in a
tool QMVerif and evaluate it on cryptographic benchmarks. The ex-
perimental results show the effectiveness and efficiency of our approach.
1 Introduction
Side-channel attacks aim to infer secret data (e.g. cryptographic keys) by ex-
ploiting statistical dependence between secret data and non-functional proper-
ties such as execution time [33], power consumption [34], and electromagnetic
radiation [46]. They have become a serious threat in application domains such
as cyber-physical systems. As a typical example, the power consumption of a
device executing the instruction c = p⊕ k usually depends on the secret k, and
this can be exploited via differential power analysis (DPA) [37] to deduce k.
Masking is one of the most widely-used and effective countermeasure to
thwart side-channel attacks. Masking is essentially a randomization technique for
reducing the statistical dependence between secret data and side-channel infor-
mation (e.g. power consumption). For example, using Boolean masking scheme,
one can mask the secret data k by applying the exclusive-or (⊕) operation with a
random variable r, yielding a masked secret data k⊕ r. It can be readily verified
that the distribution of k⊕r is independent of the value of k when r is uniformly
distributed. Besides Boolean masking scheme, there are other masking schemes
such as additive masking schemes (e.g. (k+ r) mod n) and multiplicative mask-
ing schemes (e.g. (k × r) mod n). A variety of masking implementations such
as AES and its non-linear components (S-boxes) have been published over the
years. However, designing effective and efficient masking schemes is still a no-
toriously difficult task, especially for non-linear functions. This has motivated
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a large amount of work on verifying whether masked implementations, as ei-
ther (hardware) circuits or (software) programs, are statistically independent
of secret inputs. Typically, masked hardware implementations are modeled as
(probabilistic) Boolean programs where all variables range over the Boolean do-
main (i.e. GF(2)), while masked software implementations, featuring a richer set
of operations, require to be modeled as (probabilistic) arithmetic programs.
Verification techniques for masking schemes can be roughly classified into
type system based approaches [38,3,4,5,16,14,19] and model-counting based ap-
proaches [25,24,50]. The basic idea of type system based approaches is to infer
a distribution type for observable variables in the program that are potentially
exposed to attackers. From the type information one may be able to show that
the program is secure. This class of approaches is generally very efficient mainly
because of their static analysis nature. However, they may give inconclusive an-
swers as most existing type systems do not provide completeness guarantees.
Model-counting based approaches, unsurprisingly, encode the verification
problem as a series of model-counting problems, and typically leverage SAT/SMT
solvers. The main advantage of this approach is its completeness guarantees.
However, the size of the SMT formula is exponential in the number of (bits of)
random variables used in masking, hence the approach poses great challenges to
its scalability. We mention that, within this category, some work further exploits
Fourier analysis [11,15], which considers the Fourier expansion of the Boolean
functions. The verification problem can then be reduced to checking whether
certain coefficients of the Fourier expansion are zero or not. Although there is
no hurdle in principle, to our best knowledge, currently model-counting based
approaches are limited to Boolean programs only.
While verification of masking for Boolean programs is well-studied [25,24,50],
generalizing them to arithmetic programs brings additional challenges. First of
all, arithmetic programs admit more operations which are absent from Boolean
programs. A typical example is field multiplication. In the Boolean domain, it
is nothing more than the logical AND operator. However for GF(2n) (typically
n = 8 in cryptographic algorithm implementations), the operation is nontrivial
which prohibits many optimization which would otherwise be useful for Boolean
domains. Second, verification of arithmetic programs often suffers from serious
scalability issues, especially when the model-counting based approaches are ap-
plied. We note that transforming arithmetic programs into equivalent Boolean
versions is theoretically possible, but suffer from several deficiencies: (1) one
has to encode complicated arithmetic operations (e.g. finite field multiplication)
as bitwise operations; (2) the resulting Boolean program needs to be checked
against high-order attacks which are supposed to observe multiple observations
simultaneously. This is a far more difficult problem. Because of this, we believe
such an approach is practically unfavourable, if not infeasible.
Perfect masking is ideal but not necessarily holds when there are flaws or only
a limited number of random variables are allowed for efficiency consideration. In
case that the program is not perfectly masked (i.e., a potential side channel does
exist), naturally one wants to tell how severe it is. For instance, one possible
measure is the resource the attacker needs to invest in order to infer the secret
from the side channel. For this purpose, we adapt the notion of Quantitative
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Masking Strength, with which a correlation of the number of power traces to
successfully infer secret data has been established empirically [26,27].
Main contributions.We mainly focus on the verification of masked arithmetic
programs. We advocate a hybrid verification method combining type system
based and model-counting based approaches, and provide additional quantitative
analysis. We summarize the main contributions as follows.
– We provide a hybrid approach which integrates type system based and
model-counting based approaches into a framework, and support a sound
and complete reasoning of masked arithmetic programs.
– We provide quantitative analysis in case when the masking is not effective,
to calculate a quantitative measure of the information leakage.
– We provide various heuristics and optimized algorithms to significantly im-
prove the scalability of previous approaches.
– We implement our approaches in a software tool and provide thorough eval-
uations. Our experiments show orders of magnitude of improvement with
respect to previous verification methods on common benchmarks.
One of the advantages of our approaches is the simplicity which renders
them amenable for implementations and easily extensible to other settings. We
also find, perhaps surprisingly, that for model-counting, the widely adopted ap-
proaches based on SMT solvers (e.g. [25,24,50]) may not be the best approach, as
our experiments suggest that an alternative brute-force approach is comparable
for Boolean programs, and significantly outperforms for arithmetic programs.
Related work. The d-threshold probing model is the de facto standard leakage
model for formal verification of masked programs against order-d power side-
channel attacks [32]. This paper focuses on the case that d = 1. Other models like
noise leakage model [17,45], bounded moment model [6], and threshold probing
model with transitions/glitch [20,15] could be reduced to the threshold probing
model, at the cost of introducing higher orders [3]. Other work on side channels
such as execution-time, faults, and cache do exist ([33,1,2,12,28,7,8,31] to cite a
few), but is orthogonal to our work.
Type systems have been widely used in the verification of side channel at-
tacks with early work [38,9], where masking compilers are provided which can
transform an input program into a functionally equivalent program that is re-
sistant to first-order DPA. However, these systems either are limited to certain
operations (i.e., ⊕ and table look-up), or suffer from unsoundness and incom-
pleteness under the threshold probing model. To support verification of high-
order masking, Barthe et al. introduced the notion of noninterference (NI, [3]),
and strong t-noninterference (SNI, [4]), which were extended to give a unified
framework for both software and hardware implementations in maskVerif [5].
Further work along this line includes improvements for efficiency [14,19], gener-
alization for assembly-level code [15], and extensions with glitches for hardware
programs [29]. As mentioned earlier, these approaches are incomplete, i.e., secure
programs may fail to pass their verification.
[25,24] proposed a model-counting based approach for Boolean programs by
leveraging SMT solvers, which is complete but limited in scalability. To improve
efficiency, a hybrid approach integrating type-based and model-counting based
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approaches [25,24] was proposed in [50], which is similar to the current work in
spirit. However, it is limited to Boolean programs and qualitative analysis only.
[26,27] extended the approach of [25,24] for quantitative analysis, but is limited
to Boolean programs. The current work not only extends the applicability but
also achieves significant improvement in efficiency even for Boolean programs
(cf. Section 5). We also find that solving model-counting via SMT solvers [24,50]
may not be the best approach, in particular for arithmetic programs.
Furthermore, we mention that masking synthesis is recently proposed [28,4]
to transform an input program into a functionally equivalent, perfectly masked
one. This technique is based on the perfect masking verification [25,24,3].
Our work is also related to quantitative information flow (QIF) [35,44,49,43,13]
which leverages notions from information theory (typically Shannon entropy
and mutual information) to measure the flow of information in programs. The
QIF framework has also been specialized to side-channel analysis [42,41,36]. The
main differences are, first of all, QIF targets fully-fledged programs (including
branching and loops) so program analysis techniques (e.g. symbolic execution)
are needed, while we deal with more specialized (transformed) masked programs
in straight-line forms; second, to measure the information leakage quantitatively,
our measure is based on the notion of QMS which is correlated with the number
of power traces needed to successfully infer the secret, while QIF is based on
a more general sense of information theory; third, for calculating such a mea-
sure, both work rely on model-counting. In QIF, the constraints over the input
are usually linear, but the constraints in our setting involve arithmetic opera-
tions in rings and fields. Randomized approximate schemes can be exploited in
QIF [36,13] which is not suitable in our setting. Moreover, we mention that in
QIF, input variables should in principle be partitioned into public and private
variables, and the former of which needs to be existentially quantified. This was
briefly mentioned in, e.g., [36] but without implementation.
2 Preliminaries
Let us fix a bounded integer domain D = {0, · · · , 2n − 1}, where n is a fixed
positive integer. Bit-wise operations are defined over D, but we shall also consider
arithmetic operations over D which include +,−,× modulo 2n for which D is
consider to be a ring and the Galois field multiplication ⊙ where D is isomorphic
to GF(2)[x]/(p(x)) (or simply GF(2n)) for some irreducible polynomial p. For
instance, in AES one normally uses GF(28) and p(x) = x8 + x4 + x3 + x2 + 1.
2.1 Cryptographic Programs
We focus on programs written in C-like code that implement cryptographic algo-
rithms such as AES, as opposed to arbitrary software programs. To analyze such
programs, it is common to assume that they are given in straight-line forms (i.e.,
branching-free) over D [24,3]. The syntax of the program under consideration is
given as follows, where c ∈ D.
Operation: O ∋ ◦ ::= ⊕ | ∧ | ∨ | ⊙ | + | − | ×
Expression: e ::= c | x | e ◦ e | ¬e | e≪ c | e≫ c
Statememt: stmt ::= x← e | stmt; stmt
Program: P (Xp, Xk, Xr) ::= stmt; return x1, ..., xm;
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A program P consists of a sequence of assignments followed by a return state-
ment. An assignment x← e assigns the value of the expression e to the variable
x, where e is built up from a set of variables and constants using (1) bit-wise
operations negation (¬), and (∧), or (∨), exclusive-or (⊕), left shift ≪ and
right shift ≫; (2) modulo 2n arithmetic operations: addition (+), subtraction
(−), multiplication (×); and (3) finite-field multiplication (⊙) (over GF(2n))3.
We denote by O∗ the extended set O ∪ {≪,≫} of operations.
Given a program P , let X = Xp ⊎Xk ⊎Xi ⊎Xr denote the set of variables
used in P , where Xp, Xk and Xi respectively denote the set of public input,
private input and internal variables, and Xr denotes the set of (uniformly dis-
tributed) random variables for masking private variables. We assume that the
program is given in the single static assignment (SSA) form and each expression
uses at most one operator. (One can easily transform an arbitrary straight-line
program into an equivalent one satisfying these conditions.) For each assignment
x← e in P , the computation E(x) of x is an expression obtained from e by itera-
tively replacing all the occurrences of the internal variables in e by their defining
expressions in P . SSA form guarantees that E(x) is well-defined.
Semantics. A valuation is a function σ : Xp ∪Xk → D assigning to each variable
x ∈ Xp∪Xk a value c ∈ D. Let Θ denote the set of all valuations. Two valuations
σ1, σ2 ∈ Θ are Y -equivalent, denoted by σ1 ≈Y σ2, if σ1(x) = σ2(x) for all x ∈ Y .
Given an expression e in terms of Xp ∪Xk ∪Xr and a valuation σ ∈ Θ, we
denote by e(σ) the expression obtained from e by replacing all the occurrences
of variables x ∈ Xp ∪ Xk by their values σ(x), and denote by JeKσ the distri-
bution of e (with respect to the uniform distribution of random variables e(σ)
may contain). Concretely, JeKσ(v) is the probability of the expression e(σ) being
evaluated to v for each v ∈ D. For each variable x ∈ X and valuation σ ∈ Θ,
we denote by JxKσ the distribution JE(x)Kσ. The semantics of the program P is
defined as a (partial) function JP K which takes a valuation σ ∈ Θ and an internal
variable x ∈ Xi as inputs, returns the distribution JxKσ of x.
2.2 Threat Models and Security Notions
We assume that the adversary has access to public input Xp, but not to private
input Xk or random variables Xr, of a program P . However, the adversary may
have access to an internal variable x ∈ Xi via side-channel information. Under
these assumptions, the goal of the adversary is to deduce the information of Xk.
Definition 1. Let P be a program. For every internal variable x ∈ Xi,
– x is uniform in P , denoted by x-UF, if JP K(σ)(x) is uniform for all σ ∈ Θ.
– x is statistically independent in P , denoted by x-SI, if JP K(σ1)(x) = JP K(σ2)(x)
for all (σ1, σ2) ∈ Θ2Xp , where Θ
2
Xp
:= {(σ1, σ2) ∈ Θ ×Θ | σ1 ≈Xp σ2}.
The following property is straightforward. Note that its converse does not
hold in general.
3 Note that addition/subtraction over Galois fields is essentially bit-wise exclusive-or.
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1 Cube(k, r0, r1){
2 x = k ⊕ r0 ;
3 x0 = x⊙ x ;
4 x1 = r0 ⊙ r0 ;
5 x2 = x0 ⊙ r0 ;
6 x3 = x1 ⊙ x ;
7 x4 = r1 ⊕ x2 ;
8 x5 = x4 ⊕ x3 ;
9 x6 = x0 ⊙ x ;
10 x7 = x6 ⊕ r1 ;
11 x8 = x1 ⊙ r0 ;
12 x9 = x8 ⊕ x5 ;
13 return (x7, x9) ;
14 }
Fig. 1. A buggy version of the cubing algorithm from [47]
Proposition 1. If the program P is x-UF, then P is x-SI.
Definition 2. For a program P , a variable x is perfectly masked (a.k.a. secure
under 1-threshold probing model [32]) in P if it is x-SI, otherwise x is leaky.
P is perfectly masked if all internal variables in P are perfectly masked.
2.3 Quantitative Masking Strength
When a program is not perfectly masked, it is important to quantify how secure
it is. For this purpose, we adapt the notion of Quantitative Masking Strength
(QMS) from [26,27] to quantify the strength of masking countermeasures.
Definition 3. The quantitative masking strength QMSx of a variable x ∈ X, is
defined as: 1−max(σ1,σ2)∈Θ2Xp ,c∈D
(
JxKσ1(c)− JxKσ2(c)
)
.
Accordingly, the quantitative masking strength of the program P is defined by
QMSP := minx∈Xi QMSx.
The notion of QMS generalizes that of perfect masking, i.e., P is x-SI iff
QMSx = 1. The importance of QMS has been highlighted in [26,27] where it is
empirically shown that, for Boolean programs the number of power traces needed
to determine the secret key is exponential in the QMS value. This study suggests
that computing accurate QMS values for leaky variables is highly desirable.
Example 1. Let us consider the program in Fig. 1, which implements a buggy
cubing algorithm in GF(28) from [47]. Given a secret key k, to avoid first-order
side-channel attacks, k is masked by a random variable r0 leading to two shares
x = k⊕r0 and r0. Cube(k, r0, r1) returns two shares x7 and x9 such that x7⊕x9 =
k3 := k ⊙ k ⊙ k, where r1 is another random variable.
Cube computes k⊙ k by x0 = x⊙ x and x1 = r0 ⊙ r0 (Lines 3-4), as k⊙ k =
x0 ⊕ x1. Then, it computes k3 by a secure multiplication of two pairs of shares
(x0, x1) and (x, r0) using the random variable r1 (Lines 5-12). However, this
program is vulnerable to first-order side-channel attacks. As shown in [47], we
shall refresh (x0, x1) before computing k
2 ⊙ k by inserting x0 = x0 ⊕ r2 and
x1 = x1 ⊕ r2 after Line 4, where r2 is a random variable. We use this buggy
version as a running example to illustrate our techniques.
As setup, we have:Xp = ∅,Xk = {k},Xr = {r0, r1} andXi = {x, x0, · · · , x9}.
The computations E(·) of internal variables are:
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E(x) = k ⊕ r0 E(x0) = (k ⊕ r0)⊙ (k ⊕ r0) E(x1) = r0 ⊙ r0
E(x2) = ((k ⊕ r0)⊙ (k ⊕ r0))⊙ r0 E(x3) = (r0 ⊙ r0)⊙ (k ⊕ r0)
E(x4) = r1 ⊕ (((k ⊕ r0)⊙ (k ⊕ r0))⊙ r0) E(x6) = ((k ⊕ r0)⊙ (k ⊕ r0))⊙ (k ⊕ r0)
E(x5) = (r1 ⊕ ((k ⊕ r0)⊙ (k ⊕ r0))⊙ r0)⊕ ((r0 ⊙ r0)⊙ (k ⊕ r0))
E(x7) = (((k ⊕ r0)⊙ (k ⊕ r0))⊙ (k ⊕ r0))⊕ r1 E(x8) = (r0 ⊙ r0)⊙ r0
E(x9) = ((r0 ⊙ r0)⊙ r0)⊕ ((r1 ⊕ ((k ⊕ r0)⊙ (k ⊕ r0)⊙ r0))⊕ ((r0 ⊙ r0)⊙ (k ⊕ r0)))
3 Three Key Techniques
In this section, we introduce three key techniques: type system, model-counting
based reasoning and reduction techniques, which will be used in our algorithm.
3.1 Type System
We present a type system for formally inferring distribution types of internal
variables, inspired by prior work [40,3,14,50]. We start with some basic notations.
Definition 4 (Dominant variables). Given an expression e, a random vari-
able r is called a dominant variable of e if the following two conditions hold: (i)
r occurs in e exactly once, and (ii) each operator on the path between the leaf r
and the root in the abstract syntax tree of e satisfies that it is either from {×,⊙}
and one of its children is a non-zero constant or from {⊕,¬,+,−}.
Remark that in Definition 4, for efficiency consideration, we take a purely
syntactic approach meaning that we do not simplify e when checking the condi-
tion (i) that r occurs exactly once. For instance, x is not a dominant variable in
((x ⊕ y)⊕ x)⊕ x, although intuitively e is equivalent to y ⊕ x.
Given an expression e, let Var(e) be the set of variables occurring in e, and
RVar(e) := Var(e)∩Xr . We denote by Dom(e) ⊆ RVar(e) the set of all dominant
random variables of e, which can be computed in linear time in the size of e. It
is straightforward to have
Proposition 2. If Dom(E(x)) 6= ∅, then P is x-UF.
Definition 5 (Distribution Types). Let T = {RUD, SID, SDD,UKD} be the
set of distribution types, where for each variable x ∈ X,
– E(x) : RUD meaning that the program is x-UF;
– E(x) : SID meaning that the program is x-SI;
– E(x) : SDD meaning that the program is not x-SI;
– E(x) : UKD meaning that the distribution type of x is unknown.
where RUD is a subtype of SID (cf. Proposition 1).
Type judgements, as usual, are defined in the form of ⊢ e : τ, where e is an
expression in terms of Xr ∪Xk ∪ Xp, and τ ∈ T denotes the distribution type
of e. A type judgement ⊢ e : RUD (resp. ⊢ e : SID and ⊢ e : SDD) is valid iff
P is x-UF (resp. x-SI and not x-SI) for all variables x such that E(x) = e. A
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Dom(e) 6= ∅
⊢ e : RUD
(Dom)
⊢ e1 ⋆ e2 : τ
⊢ e2 ⋆ e1 : τ
(Com) ⊢ e : τ
⊢ ¬e : τ
(Ide1)
⊢ e : SID
⊢ e • e : SID
(Ide2)
⊢ e ⋄ e : SID
(Ide3)
⊢ e : SDD
⊢ e ⊲⊳ e : SDD
(Ide4)
Var(e) ∩Xk = ∅
⊢ e : SID
(NoKey)
x ∈ Xk
⊢ x : SDD
(Key)
⊢ e1 : RUD ⊢ e2 : RUD
Dom(e1) \ RVar(e2) 6= ∅
⊢ e1 ◦ e2 : SID
(Sid1)
⊢ e1 : SID ⊢ e2 : SID
RVar(e1) ∩ RVar(e2) = ∅
⊢ e1 • e2 : SID
(Sid2)
⊢ e1 : SDD ⊢ e2 : RUD
Dom(e2) \ RVar(e1) 6= ∅
⊢ e1 ◦ e2 : SDD
(Sdd)
No rule is
appliable to e
⊢ e : UKD
(Ukd)
Fig. 2. Type inference rules, where ⋆ ∈ O, ◦ ∈ {∧,∨,⊙,×}, • ∈ O∗, ⊲⊳∈ {∧,∨} and
⋄ ∈ {⊕,−}.
sound proof system for deriving valid type judgements for expressions is given
in Fig. 2.
Rule (Dom) states that expression e containing some dominant variable has
type RUD (cf. Proposition 2). Rule (Com) captures the commutative law of
operators ⋆ ∈ O. Rules (Idei) for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 are straightforward.
Rule (NoKey) states that expression e has type SID if e does not use any
private input. Rule (Key) states that each private input has type SDD.
Rule (Sid1) states that expression e1 ◦ e2 for ◦ ∈ {∧,∨,⊙,×} has type SID,
if both e1 and e2 have type RUD, and e1 has a dominant variable r which is
not used by e2. Indeed, e1 ◦ e2 can be seen as r ◦ e2, then for each valuation
η ∈ Θ, the distributions of r and e2(η) are independent. Rule (Sid2) states that
expression e1 • e2 for • ∈ O∗ has type SID, if both e1 and e2 have type SID (as
well as its subtype RUD), and the sets of random variables used by e1 and e2
are disjoint. Likewise, for each valuation η ∈ Θ, the distributions on e1(η) and
e2(η) are independent.
Rule (Sdd) states that expression e1 ◦ e2 for ◦ ∈ {∧,∨,⊙,×} has type SDD,
if e1 has type SDD, e2 has type RUD, and e2 has a dominant variable r which is
not used by e1. Intuitively, e1 ◦ e2 can be safely seen as e1 ◦ r.
Finally, if no rule is applicable to an expression e, then e has unknown dis-
tribution type. Such a type is needed because our type system is—by design—
incomplete. However, we expect—and demonstrate empirically—that for cryp-
tographic programs, most internal variables have a definitive type other than
UKD. As we will show later, to resolve UKD-typed variables, one can resort to
model-counting (cf. Section 3.2).
Theorem 1. If ⊢ E(x) : RUD (resp. ⊢ E(x) : SID and ⊢ E(x) : SDD) is valid,
then P is x-UF (resp. x-SI and not x-SI).
Example 2. Consider the program in Fig. 1, we have:
⊢ E(x) : RUD; ⊢ E(x0) : SID; ⊢ E(x1) : SID; ⊢ E(x2) : UKD;
⊢ E(x3) : UKD; ⊢ E(x4) : RUD; ⊢ E(x5) : RUD; ⊢ E(x6) : UKD;
⊢ E(x7) : RUD; ⊢ E(x8) : SID; ⊢ E(x9) : RUD.
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3.2 Model-Counting based Reasoning
Recall that for x ∈ Xi, QMSx := 1−max(σ1,σ2)∈Θ2Xp ,c∈D
(JxKσ1(c)− JxKσ2(c)).
To compute QMSx, one na¨ıve approach is to use brute-force to enumerate all
possible valuations σ and then to compute distributions JxKσ again by enumer-
ating the assignments of random variables. This approach is exponential in the
number of (bits of) variables in E(x).
Another approach is to lift the SMT-based approach [26,27] from Boolean
setting to the arithmetic one. We first consider a “decision” version of the prob-
lem, i.e., checking whether QMSx ≥ q for a given rational number q ∈ [0, 1]. It is
not difficult to observe that this can be reduced to checking the satisfiability of
the following logic formula:
∃σ1, σ2 ∈ Θ
2
Xp
.∃c ∈ D.
(
♯(c = JxKσ1)− ♯(c = JxKσ2)
)
> ∆qx, (1)
where ♯(c = JxKσ1) and ♯(c = JxKσ2) respectively denote the number of satisfying
assignments of c = JxKσ1 and c = JxKσ2 , ∆
q
x = (1−q)×2
m, and m is the number
of bits of random variables in E(x).
We further encode (1) as a (quantifier-free) first-order formula Ψ qx to be solved
by an off-the-shelf SMT solver (e.g. Z3 [23]):
Ψ qx := (
∧
f :RVar(E(x))→D(Θf ∧Θ
′
f )) ∧Θb2i ∧Θ
′
b2i ∧Θ
q
diff
where
– Program logic (Θf and Θ
′
f ): for every f : RVar(E(x)) → D, Θf encodes
cf = E(x) into a logical formula with each occurrence of a random variable
r ∈ RVar(E(x)) being replaced by its value f(r), where cf is a fresh variable.
There are |D||RVar(E(x))| distinct copies, but share the same Xp and Xk. Θ′f
is similar to Θf except that all variables k ∈ Xk and cf are replaced by fresh
variables k′ and c′f respectively.
– Boolean to integer (Θb2i and Θ
′
b2i): Θb2i :=
∧
f :RVar(E(x))→D If = (c =
cf ) ? 1 : 0. It asserts that for each f : RVar(E(x)) → D, a fresh integer
variable If is 1 if c = cf , otherwise 0. Θ
′
b2i is similar to Θb2i except that If
and cf are replaced by I
′
f and c
′
f respectively.
– Different sums (Θqdiff):
∑
f :RVar(E(x))→D If −
∑
f :RVar(E(x))→D I
′
f > ∆
q
x.
Theorem 2. Ψ qx is unsatisfiable iff QMSx ≥ q, and the size of Ψ
q
x is polynomial
in |P | and exponential in |RVar(E(x))| and |D|.
Based on Theorem 2, we present an algorithm for computing QMSx in Sec-
tion 4.2. Note that the qualitative variant of Ψ qx (i.e. q = 1) can be used to decide
whether x is statistically independent by checking whether QMSx = 1 holds. This
will be used in Algorithm 1.
Example 3. By applying the model-counting based reasoning to the program in
Fig. 1, we can conclude that x6 is perfectly masked, while x2 and x3 are leaky.
This cannot be done by our type system or the ones in [3,4].
To give a sample encoding, consider the variable x3 for q =
1
2 and D =
{0, 1, 2, 3}. We have that Ψ
1
2
x3 is
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

c0 = (0⊙ 0)⊙ (k ⊕ 0) ∧ c
′
0 = (0⊙ 0)⊙ (k
′ ⊕ 0) ∧
c1 = (1⊙ 1)⊙ (k ⊕ 1) ∧ c
′
1 = (1⊙ 1)⊙ (k
′ ⊕ 1) ∧
c2 = (2⊙ 2)⊙ (k ⊕ 2) ∧ c
′
2 = (2⊙ 2)⊙ (k
′ ⊕ 2) ∧
c3 = (3⊙ 3)⊙ (k ⊕ 3) ∧ c
′
3 = (3⊙ 3)⊙ (k
′ ⊕ 3)

∧
(
I0 = (c = c0) ? 1 : 0 ∧ I1 = (c = c1) ? 1 : 0 ∧
I2 = (c = c2) ? 1 : 0 ∧ I3 = (c = c3) ? 1 : 0
)
∧(
I ′0 = (c = c
′
0) ? 1 : 0 ∧ I
′
1 = (c = c
′
1) ? 1 : 0 ∧
I ′2 = (c = c
′
2) ? 1 : 0 ∧ I
′
3 = (c = c
′
3) ? 1 : 0
)
∧
(I0 + I1 + I2 + I3)− (I
′
0 + I
′
1 + I
′
2 + I
′
3) > (1−
1
2
)2
3.3 Reduction Heuristics
In this section, we provide various heuristics to reduce the size of formulae. These
can be both applied to type inference and model-counting based reasoning.
Ineffective variable elimination. A variable x is ineffective in an expression e
if for all valuations σ1, σ2 ∈ Θ such that σ1 ≈Var(e)\{x} σ2, we have σ1(e) = σ2(e).
Otherwise, we say x is effective in e. Clearly if x is ineffective in e, then e and
e[c/x] are equivalent for any c ∈ D while e[c/x] contains less variables, where
e[c/x] is obtained from e by replacing all occurrences of x with c .
Checking whether x is effective or not in e can be performed by a satisfiability
checking of the logical formula: e[c/x] 6= e[c′/x]. Obviously, e[c/x] 6= e[c′/x] is
satisfiable iff x is effective in e.
Algebraic laws. For every sub-expression e′ of the form e1⊕ e1, e1− e1, e ◦ 0 or
0 ◦ e with ◦ ∈ {×,⊙,∧} in the expression e, it is safe to replace e′ by 0, namely,
e and e[0/e′] are equivalent. Note that the constant 0 is usually introduced by
instantiating ineffective variables by 0 when eliminating ineffective variables.
Dominated Subexpression Elimination. Given an expression e, if e′ is an
r-dominated sub-expression in e and r does not occur in e elsewhere, then it is
safe to replace each occurrence of e′ in e by the random variable r. Intuitively,
e′ as a whole can be seen as a random variable when evaluating e. Besides
this elimination, we also allow to add mete-theorems specifying forms of sub-
expressions e′ that can be replaced by a fresh variable. For instance, r ⊕ ((2 ×
r) ∧ e′′) in e, when the random variable r does not appear elsewhere, can be
replaced by the random variable r.
Transformation Oracle. We suppose there is an oracle Ω which, whenever
possible, transforms an expression e into an equivalent expression Ω(e) such
that type inference (may with above heuristics) can give a non-UKD type to
Ω(e). Such a transformation is required only in one program in our experiments.
Let ê denote the expression obtained by applying the above heuristics (ex-
cluding transformation oracle) on the expression e.
Lemma 1. E(x)(σ) and Ê(x)(σ) have same distribution for any σ ∈ Θ.
Example 4. Consider the variable x6 in the program in Fig. 1, (k ⊕ r0) is r0-
dominated sub-expression in E(x6) = ((k ⊕ r0) ⊙ (k ⊕ r0)) ⊙ (k ⊕ r0), then, we
can simplify E(x6) into Ê(x6) = r0 ⊙ r0 ⊙ r0. Therefore, we can deduce that
⊢ E(x6) : SID by applying rule (NoKey) on Ê(x6).
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Algorithm 1: Perfect masking verification
1 Function PMChecking(P,Xp, Xk, Xr, Xi)
2 foreach x ∈ Xi do
3 if ⊢ E(x) : UKD is valid then
4 if ⊢ Ê(x) : UKD is valid then
5 if Ω(Ê(x)) exists then
6 Let ⊢ E(x) : τ be valid for valid ⊢ Ω(Ê(x)) : τ ;
7 else if ModelCountingBasedSolver(Ê(x))=SAT then
8 Let ⊢ E(x) : SDD be valid;
9 else Let ⊢ E(x) : SID be valid;
10 else Let ⊢ E(x) : τ be valid for valid ⊢ Ê(x) : τ ;
4 Overall Algorithms
4.1 Perfect Masking Verification
Given a program P with the sets of public (Xp), secret (Xk), random (Xr) and
internal (Xi) variables, PMChecking, given in Algorithm 1, checks whether P
is perfectly masked or not. It iteratively traverses all the internal variables. For
each variable x ∈ Xi, it first applies the type system to infer its distribution
type. If ⊢ E(x) : τ for τ 6= UKD is valid, then the result is conclusive. Otherwise,
we will simplify the expression E(x) and apply the type inference to Ê(x).
If it fails to resolve the type of x and O(Ê(x)) does not exist, we apply
the model-counting based (SMT-based or brute-force) method outlined in Sec-
tion 3.2, in particular, to check the expression Ê(x). There are two possible
outcomes: either Ê(x) is SID or SDD. We enforce E(x) to have the same distri-
butional type as Ê(x) which might facilitate the inference for other expressions.
Theorem 3. P is perfectly masked iff ⊢ E(x) : SDD is not valid for any x ∈ Xi,
when Algorithm 1 terminates.
We remark that, if the model-counting is disabled in Algorithm 1 where
UKD-typed variables are interpreted as potentially leaky, Algorithm 1 would
degenerate to a sound type inference procedure that is fast and potentially more
accurate than the one in [3], owing to the optimization introduced in Section 3.3.
4.2 QMS Computing
After applying Algorithm 1, each internal variable x ∈ Xi is endowed by a
distributional type of either SID (or RUD which implies SID) or SDD. In the
former case, x is perfectly masked meaning observing x would gain nothing for
side-channel attackers. In the latter case, however, x becomes a side-channel and
it is natural to ask how many power traces are required to infer secret data from
x of which we have provided a measure formalized via QMS.
QMSComputing, given in Algorithm 2, computes QMSx for each x ∈ Xi.
It first invokes the function PMChecking for perfect masking verification. For
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Algorithm 2: Computing QMS
1 Function QMSComputing(P,Xp, Xk, Xr, Xi)
2 PMChecking(P,Xp, Xk, Xr, Xi);
3 foreach x ∈ Xi do
4 if ⊢ E(x) : SID is valid then QMSx := 1;
5 else
6 if RVar(Ê(x)) = ∅ then QMSx := 0;
7 else
8 low := 0; high := 2n×|RVar(Ê(x))|;
9 while low < high do
10 mid := ⌈ low+high
2
⌉; q := mid
2n×|RVar(Ê(x))|
;
11 if SMTSolver(Ψ̂qx ) =SAT then high := mid− 1;
12 else low := mid;
13 QMSx :=
low
2n×|RVar(Ê(x))|
;
each SID-typed variable x ∈ Xi, we can directly infer that QMSx is 1. For each
leaky variable x ∈ Xi, we first check whether Ê(x) uses any random variables
or not. If it does not use any random variables, we directly deduce that QMSx
is 0. Otherwise, we use either the brute-force enumeration or an SMT-based
binary search to compute QMSx. The former one is trivial, hence not presented
in Algorithm 2. The latter one is based on the fact that QMSx =
i
2n×|RVar(Ê(x))|
for some integer 0 ≤ i ≤ 2n×|RVar(Ê(x))|. Hence the while-loop in Algorithm 2
executes at most O(n× |RVar(Ê(x))|) times for each x.
Our SMT-based binary search for computing QMS values is different from
the one proposed by Eldib et al. [26,27]. Their algorithm considers Boolean
programs only and computes QMS values by directly binary searching the QMS
value q between 0 to 1 with a pre-defined step size ǫ (ǫ = 0.01 in [26,27]).
Hence, it only approximate the actual QMS value and the binary search iterates
O(log(1
ǫ
)) times for each internal variable. Our approach works for more general
arithmetic programs and computes the accurate QMS value.
5 Practical Evaluation
We have implemented our methods in a tool named QMVerif, which uses
Z3 [23] as the underlying SMT solver (fixed size bit-vector theory). We con-
duct experiments of perfect masking verification and QMS computing on both
Boolean and arithmetic programs. Our experiments are conducted on a server
with 64-bit Ubuntu 16.04.4 LTS, Intel Xeon CPU E5-2690 v4, and 256GB RAM.
5.1 Experimental Results on Boolean Programs
We use the benchmarks from the publicly available cryptographic software imple-
mentations [25], which consist of 17 Boolean programs (P1-P17). We conducted
experiments on P12-P17, which are the regenerations of MAC-Keccak reference
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Table 1. Results on masked Boolean programs for perfect masking verification.
Name |Xi| ♯SDD ♯Count
QMVerif
SCInfer [50]
SMT B.F.
P12 197k 0 0 2.9s 2.7s 3.8s
P13 197k 4.8k 4.8k 2m 8s 2m 6s 38m 53s
P14 197k 3.2k 3.2k 1m 58s 1m 45s 42m 44s
P15 198k 1.6k 3.2k 2m 25s 2m 43s 44m 12s
P16 197k 4.8k 4.8k 1m 50s 1m 38s 48m 20s
P17 205k 17.6k 12.8k 1m 24s 1m 10s 81m 1s
Table 2. Results of masked Boolean programs for computing QMS Values.
Name ♯SDD
SC Sniffer [26,27] QMVerif
♯Iter Time Min Max Avg. ♯Iter SMT B.F. Min Max Arg.
P13 4.8k 480k 97m 23s 0.00 1.00 0.98 0 0 0 0.00 1.00 0.98
P14 3.2k 160k 40m 13s 0.51 1.00 0.99 9.6k 2m 56s 39s 0.50 1.00 0.99
P15 1.6k 80k 23m 26s 0.51 1.00 1.00 4.8k 1m 36s 1m 32s 0.50 1.00 1.00
P16 4.8k 320k 66m 27s 0.00 1.00 0.98 6.4k 1m 40s 8s 0.00 1.00 0.98
P17 17.6k 1440k 337m 46s 0.00 1.00 0.93 4.8k 51s 1s 0.00 1.00 0.94
code submitted to the SHA-3 competition held by NIST. (Relatively small ex-
amples P1-P11 are skipped which can be verified in less than 1 second.) P12-P17
are transformed into programs in the straight-line form.
Perfect masking verification. Table 1 shows the results of the perfect masking
verification on P12-P17, where Columns 2-4 show basic statistics, in particular,
they give the number of internal variables, leaky internal variables, and internal
variables which require model-counting based reasoning, respectively. Columns
5-6 respectively show the total time of our tool QMVerif using SMT-based and
brute-force methods. Column 7 shows the total time of the state-of-the-art tool
SCInfer [50].
We observe that: (1) our reduction heuristics significantly improve the perfor-
mance compared with SCInfer [50] (generally 16–69 times faster for imperfectly
masked programs; note that SCInfer is based on SMT model-counting), and (2)
the performance of the SMT-based and brute-force methods in our QMVerif
for verifying perfect masking of Boolean programs is largely leveled.
Computing QMS. For comparison purposes, we implemented the algorithm
of [25,24] for computing QMS values of leaky internal variables. Table 2 shows the
results of computing QMS values on P13-P17 (P12 is excluded because it does
not contain any leaky internal variable), where Column 2 shows the number of
leaky internal variables, Columns 3-7 show the total number of iterations in the
binary search (cf. Section 4.2), time, the minimal, maximal and average of QMS
values using the algorithm from [25,24]. Similarly, Columns 8-13 show statistics
of our toolQMVerif, in particular, Column 9 (resp. Column 10) shows the time
of using SMT-based (resp. brute-force) methods. Note that all the time reported
in Table 2 excludes the time used for perfect masking checking.
We observe that (1) the brute-force method outperforms the SMT-based one
significantly, and (2) our tool QMVerif using the SMT-based method takes
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Table 3. Results of masked arithmetic programs, where P.M.V. denotes perfect mask-
ing verification, B.F. denotes brute-force, 12 S.F. denotes that Z3 emits segmentation
fault after verifying 12 internal variables.
Description |Xi| ♯SDD ♯Count
P.M.V. QMS
SMT B.F. SMT B.F. Value
SecMult [47] 11 0 0 ≈0s ≈0s - - 1
Sbox (4) [22] 66 0 0 ≈0s ≈0s - - 1
B2A [30] 8 0 1 17s 2s - - 1
A2B [30] 46 0 0 ≈0s ≈0s - - 1
B2A [21] 82 0 0 ≈0s ≈0s - - 1
A2B [21] 41 0 0 ≈0s ≈0s - - 1
B2A [18] 11 0 1 1m 35s 10m 59s - - 1
B2A [10] 16 0 0 ≈0s ≈0s - - 1
Sbox [47] 45 0 0 ≈0s ≈0s - - 1
Sbox [48] 772 2 1 ≈0s ≈0s 0.9s ≈0s 0
k3 11 2 2 96m 59s 0.2s >4d 32s 0.988
k12 15 2 2 101m 34s 0.3s >4d 27s 0.988
k15 21 4 4 93m 27s (12 S.F.) 28m 17s >4d ≈64h 0.988, 0.980
k240 23 4 4 93m 27s (12 S.F.) 30m 9s >4d ≈64h 0.988, 0.980
k252 31 4 4 93m 27s (12 S.F.) 32m 58s >4d ≈64h 0.988, 0.980
k254 39 4 4 93m 27s (12 S.F.) 30m 9s >4d ≈64h 0.988, 0.980
significant less iterations and time, as our binary search step depends on the
number of bits of random variables, but not a pre-defined value (e.g. 0.01) as used
in [25,24]. In particular, the QMS values of leaky variables whose expressions
contain no random variables (e.g. P13 and P17), do not need the binary search.
5.2 Experimental Results on Arithmetic Programs
We collect arithmetic programs which represent non-linear functions of masked
cryptographic software implementations from literature. In Table 3, Column 1
lists the name of the functions under consideration, where k3, . . . , k254 are buggy
fragments of first-order secure exponentiation [47] without the first RefreshMask
function. Columns 2-4 show basic statistics. For all experiments, we set n = 8
and thus D = {0, · · · , 28 − 1}.
Perfect masking verification. Columns 5-6 in Table 3 show the results of the
perfect masking verification on the programs using SMT-based and brute-force
methods respectively.
We observe that: (1) some UKD-typed variables (e.g. in B2A [30], B2A [18]
and Sbox [48], meaning that the type inference is inconclusive in these cases)
can be resolved by model-counting (resulting in SID-type), and (2) on the pro-
grams (except B2A [18]) where the model-counting based reasoning is required
(i.e., ♯Count is non-zero), the brute-force method is significantly faster than the
SMT-based one. In particular, for programs k15, . . . , k254, Z3 crashed with seg-
mentation fault after verifying 12 internal variables in 93m, while the brute-force
method comfortably returns the result. To further explain the performance of
these two classes of methods, we manually examine these programs and find out
that the expressions of the UKD-typed variable in B2A [47] (where the SMT-
based method is faster) only use exclusive-or (⊕) operations and one subtraction
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(−) operation, while the expressions of the other UKD-typed variables (where
the brute-force method is faster) involve finite field multiplication (⊙).
We remark that transformation oracle and meta-theorems are only used for
A2B [30]. Theoretically, model-counting based reasoning could verify A2B [30].
However, in our experiments both SMT-based and brute-force methods failed to
terminate in 3 days, though the brute-force method had verified more internal
variables. For instance, on the expression ((2 × r1) ⊕ (x − r) ⊕ r1) ∧ r where x
is a private input and r, r1 are random variables, Z3 could not terminate in 2
days, while the brute-force method successfully verified in a few minutes. We
also tested the SMT solver Boolector [39] (the winner of SMT-COMP 2018 on
QF-BV, Main Track), which failed to terminate in 3 days. Undoubtedly more
systematic experiments are required in the future, but our results suggest that,
contrary to the common belief, currently SMT-based approaches are not promis-
ing, which calls for more scalable techniques.
Computing QMS. Columns 7-9 in Table 3 show the results of computing QMS
values of leaky variables, where Column 7 (resp. Column 8) shows the time of
the SMT-based (resp. brute-force) method for computing QMS values (excluding
the time for perfect masking checking) and Column 9 shows the QMS values of
all leaky variables (note that duplicated values are omitted).
We observe that: (1) the brute-force method can quickly compute the QMS
values of the leaky variables in Sbox [47], k3 and k12, but takes roughly 64 hours
on the other programs, (2) surprisingly, the SMT-based method is only able to
compute the QMS value of the leaky variable in Sbox [47], but fails for the others
after 4 days. Indeed, Z3 cannot even finish the first iteration of the binary search
on the smallest formula in 4 days. This, again, indicates the ineffectiveness of
current SMT-based approaches. We manually examine k3, ..., k254 programs and
find out that (1) variables used in the computations E(x) of leaky variables x
are the same, and (2) the computations that can be quickly verified contain at
most 4 operations, while the others contain at least 19 operations.
6 Conclusion
We have proposed a hybrid approach combing type inference and model-counting
to verify masked arithmetic programs against first-order side-channel attacks.
The type inference allows an efficient, lightweight procedure to determine most
observable variables whereas model-counting accounts for completeness, bring-
ing the best of two worlds. We also provided model-counting based methods to
quantify the amount of information leakage via side channels. We have presented
the tool supportQMVerif which has been evaluated on standard cryptographic
benchmarks. The experimental results showed that our method significantly out-
performed state-of-the-art techniques in terms of both accuracy and scalability.
Future work includes further improving SMT based model-counting tech-
niques which currently provide no better, if not worse, performance than the
na¨ıve brute-force method. Furthermore, generalizing the work in the current
paper to verification of higher-order masking schemes remains to be a very cha-
llenging task.
16 Pengfei Gao, Hongyi Xie, Jun Zhang, Fu Song, Taolue Chen
References
1. J. B. Almeida, M. Barbosa, G. Barthe, F. Dupressoir, and M. Emmi. Verifying
constant-time implementations. In USENIX Security Symposium, pages 53–70,
2016.
2. T. Antonopoulos, P. Gazzillo, M. Hicks, E. Koskinen, T. Terauchi, and S. Wei. De-
composition instead of self-composition for proving the absence of timing channels.
In ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Programming Language Design and Implemen-
tation, pages 362–375, 2017.
3. G. Barthe, S. Bela¨ıd, F. Dupressoir, P. Fouque, B. Gre´goire, and P. Strub. Verified
proofs of higher-order masking. In Proceedings of the 34th Annual International
Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic (EUROCRYPT),
pages 457–485, 2015.
4. G. Barthe, S. Bela¨ıd, F. Dupressoir, P. Fouque, B. Gre´goire, P. Strub, and R. Zuc-
chini. Strong non-interference and type-directed higher-order masking. In ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 116–129, 2016.
5. G. Barthe, S. Bela¨ıd, P. Fouque, and B. Gre´goire. maskverif: a formal tool for an-
alyzing software and hardware masked implementations. IACR Cryptology ePrint
Archive, 2018:562, 2018.
6. G. Barthe, F. Dupressoir, S. Faust, B. Gre´goire, F. Standaert, and P. Strub. Parallel
implementations of masking schemes and the bounded moment leakage model.
In Proceedings of the 36th Annual International Conference on the Theory and
Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Advances in Cryptology, pages 535–566,
2017.
7. G. Barthe, F. Dupressoir, P. Fouque, B. Gre´goire, and J. Zapalowicz. Synthesis
of fault attacks on cryptographic implementations. In Proceedings of the ACM
SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 1016–
1027, 2014.
8. G. Barthe, B. Ko¨pf, L. Mauborgne, and M. Ochoa. Leakage resilience against
concurrent cache attacks. In Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on
Principles of Security and Trust, Held as Part of the European Joint Conferences
on Theory and Practice of Software, pages 140–158, 2014.
9. A. G. Bayrak, F. Regazzoni, D. Novo, and P. Ienne. Sleuth: Automated verifica-
tion of software power analysis countermeasures. In Workshop on Cryptographic
Hardware and Embedded Systems, pages 293–310, 2013.
10. L. Bettale, J. Coron, and R. Zeitoun. Improved high-order conversion from boolean
to arithmetic masking. IACR Trans. Cryptogr. Hardw. Embed. Syst., 2018(2):22–
45, 2018.
11. S. Bhasin, C. Carlet, and S. Guilley. Theory of masking with codewords in hard-
ware: low-weight dth-order correlation-immune boolean functions. IACR Cryptol-
ogy ePrint Archive, 2013:303, 2013.
12. E. Biham and A. Shamir. Differential fault analysis of secret key cryptosystems.
In International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology (CRYPTO),
pages 513–525, 1997.
13. F. Biondi, M. A. Enescu, A. Heuser, A. Legay, K. S. Meel, and J. Quilbeuf. Scalable
approximation of quantitative information flow in programs. In Proceedings of
the 19th International Conference on Verification, Model Checking, and Abstract
Interpretation (VMCAI), pages 71–93, 2018.
14. E. Bisi, F. Melzani, and V. Zaccaria. Symbolic analysis of higher-order side channel
countermeasures. IEEE Trans. Computers, 66(6):1099–1105, 2017.
15. R. Bloem, H. Groß, R. Iusupov, B. Ko¨nighofer, S. Mangard, and J. Winter. For-
mal verification of masked hardware implementations in the presence of glitches.
Verification of Masked Arithmetic Programs 17
In Proceedings of the 37th Annual International Conference on the Theory and
Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Advances in Cryptology, pages 321–353,
2018.
16. J. Breier, X. Hou, and Y. Liu. Fault attacks made easy: Differential fault analysis
automation on assembly code. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2017/829, 2017.
https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/829.
17. S. Chari, C. S. Jutla, J. R. Rao, and P. Rohatgi. Towards sound approaches to
counteract power-analysis attacks. In Proceedings of the 19th Annual International
Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology, pages 398–412, 1999.
18. J. Coron. High-order conversion from boolean to arithmetic masking. In Proceed-
ings of the 19th International Conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embed-
ded Systems (CHES), pages 93–114, 2017.
19. J. Coron. Formal verification of side-channel countermeasures via elementary cir-
cuit transformations. In Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Ap-
plied Cryptography and Network Security, pages 65–82, 2018.
20. J. Coron, C. Giraud, E. Prouff, S. Renner, M. Rivain, and P. K. Vadnala. Con-
version of security proofs from one leakage model to another: A new issue. In
Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel
Analysis and Secure Design, pages 69–81, 2012.
21. J. Coron, J. Großscha¨dl, and P. K. Vadnala. Secure conversion between boolean and
arithmetic masking of any order. In Proceedings of the 16th International Workshop
on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES), pages 188–205, 2014.
22. J. Coron, E. Prouff, M. Rivain, and T. Roche. Higher-order side channel security
and mask refreshing. In International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption,
pages 410–424, 2013.
23. L. M. de Moura and N. Bjørner. Z3: an efficient SMT solver. In International
Conference on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems,
pages 337–340, 2008.
24. H. Eldib, C. Wang, and P. Schaumont. Formal verification of software counter-
measures against side-channel attacks. ACM Transactions on Software Engineering
and Methodology, 24(2):11, 2014.
25. H. Eldib, C. Wang, and P. Schaumont. SMT-based verification of software coun-
termeasures against side-channel attacks. In International Conference on Tools
and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems, pages 62–77, 2014.
26. H. Eldib, C. Wang, M. Taha, and P. Schaumont. QMS: Evaluating the side-channel
resistance of masked software from source code. In ACM/IEEE Design Automation
Conference, pages 209:1–6, 2014.
27. H. Eldib, C. Wang, M. M. I. Taha, and P. Schaumont. Quantitative masking
strength: Quantifying the power side-channel resistance of software code. IEEE
Trans. on CAD of Integrated Circuits and Systems, 34(10):1558–1568, 2015.
28. H. Eldib, M. Wu, and C. Wang. Synthesis of fault-attack countermeasures for cryp-
tographic circuits. In International Conference on Computer Aided Verification,
pages 343–363, 2016.
29. S. Faust, V. Grosso, S. M. D. Pozo, C. Paglialonga, and F. Standaert. Composable
masking schemes in the presence of physical defaults and the robust probing model.
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2017:711, 2017.
30. L. Goubin. A sound method for switching between boolean and arithmetic masking.
In Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware
and Embedded Systems, pages 3–15, 2001.
31. S. Guo, M. Wu, and C. Wang. Adversarial symbolic execution for detecting
concurrency-related cache timing leaks. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGSOFT
Symposium on the Foundations of Software Engineering, 2018.
18 Pengfei Gao, Hongyi Xie, Jun Zhang, Fu Song, Taolue Chen
32. Y. Ishai, A. Sahai, and D. A. Wagner. Private circuits: Securing hardware against
probing attacks. In International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
(CRYPTO), pages 463–481, 2003.
33. P. C. Kocher. Timing attacks on implementations of diffie-hellman, rsa, dss, and
other systems. In International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
(CRYPTO), pages 104–113, 1996.
34. P. C. Kocher, J. Jaffe, and B. Jun. Differential power analysis. In International
Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology (CRYPTO), pages 388–397,
1999.
35. P. Malacaria and J. Heusser. Information theory and security: Quantitative infor-
mation flow. In A. Aldini, M. Bernardo, A. D. Pierro, and H. Wiklicky, editors,
Formal Methods for Quantitative Aspects of Programming Languages, 10th Interna-
tional School on Formal Methods for the Design of Computer, Communication and
Software Systems, SFM 2010, Bertinoro, Italy, June 21-26, 2010, Advanced Lec-
tures, volume 6154 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 87–134. Springer,
2010.
36. P. Malacaria, M. H. R. Khouzani, C. S. Pasareanu, Q. Phan, and K. S. Luckow.
Symbolic side-channel analysis for probabilistic programs. In Proceedings of the
31st IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF), pages 313–327,
2018.
37. A. Moradi, A. Barenghi, T. Kasper, and C. Paar. On the vulnerability of FPGA
bitstream encryption against power analysis attacks: extracting keys from xilinx
virtex-ii fpgas. In ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security,
pages 111–124, 2011.
38. A. Moss, E. Oswald, D. Page, and M. Tunstall. Compiler assisted masking. In
Proceedings of the 14th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and
Embedded Systems (CHES), pages 58–75, 2012.
39. A. Niemetz, M. Preiner, and A. Biere. Boolector 2.0 system description. Journal on
Satisfiability, Boolean Modeling and Computation, 9:53–58, 2014 (published 2015).
40. I. B. E. Ouahma, Q. Meunier, K. Heydemann, and E. Encrenaz. Symbolic approach
for side-channel resistance analysis of masked assembly codes. In Security Proofs
for Embedded Systems, 2017.
41. C. S. Pasareanu, Q. Phan, and P. Malacaria. Multi-run side-channel analysis using
symbolic execution and Max-SMT. In Proceedings of the IEEE 29th Computer
Security Foundations Symposium (CSF), pages 387–400, 2016.
42. Q. Phan, L. Bang, C. S. Pasareanu, P. Malacaria, and T. Bultan. Synthesis of
adaptive side-channel attacks. In 30th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Sym-
posium, CSF 2017, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 21-25, 2017, pages 328–342.
IEEE Computer Society, 2017.
43. Q. Phan and P. Malacaria. Abstract model counting: a novel approach for quan-
tification of information leaks. In S. Moriai, T. Jaeger, and K. Sakurai, editors,
9th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security,
ASIA CCS ’14, Kyoto, Japan - June 03 - 06, 2014, pages 283–292. ACM, 2014.
44. Q. Phan, P. Malacaria, C. S. Pasareanu, and M. d’Amorim. Quantifying informa-
tion leaks using reliability analysis. In N. Rungta and O. Tkachuk, editors, 2014
International Symposium on Model Checking of Software, SPIN 2014, Proceedings,
San Jose, CA, USA, July 21-23, 2014, pages 105–108. ACM, 2014.
45. E. Prouff and M. Rivain. Masking against side-channel attacks: A formal security
proof. In Proceedings of the 32nd Annual International Conference on the Theory
and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Advances in Cryptology, pages 142–
159, 2013.
Verification of Masked Arithmetic Programs 19
46. J. Quisquater and D. Samyde. Electromagnetic analysis (EMA): measures and
counter-measures for smart cards. In International Conference on Research in
Smart Cards (E-smart), pages 200–210, 2001.
47. M. Rivain and E. Prouff. Provably secure higher-order masking of AES. In Work-
shop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, pages 413–427, 2010.
48. K. Schramm and C. Paar. Higher order masking of the AES. In Proceedings of the
RSA Conference on Topics in Cryptology (CT-RSA), pages 208–225, 2006.
49. C. G. Val, M. A. Enescu, S. Bayless, W. Aiello, and A. J. Hu. Precisely measur-
ing quantitative information flow: 10k lines of code and beyond. In IEEE Euro-
pean Symposium on Security and Privacy, EuroS&P 2016, Saarbru¨cken, Germany,
March 21-24, 2016, pages 31–46, 2016.
50. J. Zhang, P. Gao, F. Song, and C. Wang. Scinfer: Refinement-based verification
of software countermeasures against side-channel attacks. In Proceedings of the
30th International Conference on Computer Aided Verification, Held as Part of
the Federated Logic Conference, pages 157–177, 2018.
